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1 Introduction
Over the last decade central banks have shifted to a policy of announcing non-
zero inflation targets. As acknowledged in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)
the justification for this policy is however hardly found in micro-founded mod-
els. Our paper faces this problem by investigating the long-run performance of
DSGE New Keynesian model, i.e. its steady-state properties, under an infla-
tion targeting regime. Although, in fact, New Keynesian models are providing
new perspectives on stabilization policies,1 less attention has been placed on
the their long-run properties as long-term markups are usually considered to be
exogenous by assuming as given monopolistic distortions in the labor and goods
markets. The assumption of exogenous markups has several negative short-
comings. For instance, little can be say about the long-term inflation, which
is typically assumed to be constant and zero despite overwhelming evidence of
∗The authors are grateful to P. Beningo, A. Cukierman, J. Driffill, L. Lambertini, D.
Soskice for useful comments on earlier drafts.
1 See Clarida et al. (1999), Woodford (2003), Christiano et al. (2005), Galì and Gertler
(2007).
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the contrary,2 and potential relationship between the short and long run output
gaps both in levels and variances.3
The figure below illustrates the inflation behavior for the United States.
Trend inflation is clearly always different form zero in both simple and moving
average.4
Figure 1 — Inflation in the United State (1966Q1-2005Q3).
In micro-foundations context, Khan et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004, 2007), Ropele and Ascari (2007) are exceptions to the usual proce-
dure of log-linearizign around a zero steady state. Khan et al. (2003) show that
the optimal long-run inflation rate is actually negative, because a negative rate
balances the benefits of following the Friedman rule and the costs of relative
price distortions.5 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) perform a similar exercise
in a medium-scale model incorporating fiscal policy and many distortions. They
find that optimal monetary policy can differ from the Friedamn rule, but trend
inflation is still negative, and only if one assumes that lump-sum taxes are avail-
able. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) instead consider optimal monetary and
fiscal policy by treating the level of trend inflation as exogenously calibrated to
US post-war data. Ropele and Ascari (2007) consider how optimal monetary
policy is affected by changes in trend inflation. They extend the standard DSGE
New Keynesian model to allow for positive trend inflation, which is however in-
troduced exogenously. They find that even low trend inflation has strong effects
on optimal monetary policy and the dynamics of inflation, output, and interest
2See, e.g., Ascari (2004), Angeloni et al. (2006), Gali et al. (2007), Benigno and Ricci
(2008).
3For a discussion about this issue, see, among others, Goodfriend (1997); Martin and
Rogers (1997), Woodford (2003), Blackburn and Pelloni (2004, 2005), and Benigno and Ricci
(2008).
4The blue line is the period mean and red line is the average moving mean (5 years).
5The same is true in Neiss (1999). In our model, negative inflation is efficient, but as we
will show is not optimal under inflation targeting.
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rates. By considering discretionary policy, efficiency deteriorates and there is no
guarantee of determinacy. Moreover, commitment, targeting non-zero trend in-
flation, also leads to substantial welfare losses. All of them exogenously assume
trend inflation.6
By explicitly considering micro-foundations and a DSGE context, Benigno
and Ricci (2008) show that, when wage setters take into account the future
consequences of their current wage choices in the presence of downward nomi-
nal wage rigidities, a long-run Phillips curve relates average unemployment to
average wage inflation; the curve is virtually vertical for high inflation rates but
becomes flatter as inflation declines. Several results about volatilities are also
derived. However, downward nominal wage rigidities are, once again, exoge-
nously introduced.7
In this paper we consider a general equilibrium model with monopolistic
competition in the goods and labor markets, developed by Neiss (1999), where a
staggered timing structure in the acquisition of nominal money balances within
a money-in-the-utility function framework generates a discretionary inflation
equilibrium. We extend Neiss (1999) to inflation targeting. To simplify the
analysis we assume full price flexibility in the goods market, whereas wages are
predetermined. As in Gnocchi (2006a) and (2006b) we consider endogenous
markups but we assume neither zero trend inflation nor non-atomistic wage
setters. Differently from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007) and Ropele and
Ascari (2007) we do not assume positive trend inflation, but derive it from the
optimization of the central bank. In our context in fact inflation is optimal as in
Khan et al. (2003), but positive, as we show that although negative inflation is
efficient for the central bank is optimal a commitment to a positive rate because
the endogenous markup ultimately depends on the central bank’s target.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines our
baseline model. Section 3 derives and explains our main result, i.e. a positive
inflation target disciplines wage setters. Section 4 evaluates welfare and derives
the optimal target. A final section concludes.
2 The baseline model
The representative household (i) maximizes the following utility function
U =
∞X
t=0
βt
Ã
lnCt,i − ηlt,i +
γ
1− ε
µ
Mt,i
Pt
¶1−ε!
(1)
6Apart from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007).
7They also find that macro-economic volatility shifts the Phillips curve outward, implying
that stabilization policies can play an important role in shaping the trade-off. Moreover in their
model nominal wages tend to be endogenously rigid also upward, at a low inflation. and when
inflation decreases, the volatility of unemployment increases whereas the volatility of inflation
decreases (this implies a long-run trade-off also between the volatility of unemployment and
that of wage inflation).
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where β ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount rate, Ct,i is a consumption bundle,
lt,i is a differentiated labor type that is supplied to all firms,
Mt,i
Pt
denotes real
money holdings.8 Consumption basket and price index are defined as follows:
Ct =
³R 1
0
ct(j)ρdj
´ 1ρ
and Pt =
³R 1
0
pt(i)
ρ
ρ−1 di
´ ρ−1ρ
.
The flow budget constraint is:
Ct,i +
Mt+1,i
Pt,i
+
Bt+1,i
Pt
=
wt,i
Pt
lt,i +
Mt,i
Pt
+
ξt
Pt
+ θt +Rt
Bt,i
Pt
(2)
where Bt,i denotes holdings of one-period bonds; wt,i is the nominal wage; ξt
is a lump-sum transfer from central bank profits, θt denotes firms profits, Rt is
the nominal interest rate. Note that Mt+1,i is chosen at t.
The representative household (i) chooses consumption and nominal money
holding. By contrast, we assume that wage are set by atomistic labor unions
or a single non-strategic union (as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004), which
supply labor monopolistically to a continuum of labor markets of measure 1
indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. In each labor market j, the union faces a demand for
labor given by
³
wjt/wt
´−σ
ldt , where w
j
t denotes the nominal wage charged by
the union in labor market j at time t, wt is an index of nominal wages prevailing
in the economy, and ldt is a measure of aggregate labor demand by firms.
In the goods market, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. Each firm (j) produces a
differentiated good using a Cobb-Douglas production function:9
yt(j) = lt(j)α (3)
where
lt,j =
⎡
⎣
1Z
0
lt,j(i)
σ−1
σ di
⎤
⎦
σ
σ−1
(4)
denotes a labour bundle and σ is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution
across different labor inputs.
The central bank directly controls the nominal interest rate Rt+1. This, in
turn, implies that the money growth rate τ t
Mt+1 =Mt(1 + τ t) (5)
is endogenous to money demand at the given level of Rt+1.
We consider that the central bank can commit to an interest rate rule that
assures the achievement of a certain exogenous inflation target. As commitment
8New Keynesian models typically assume logarithmic preferences over real money balances
(Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001). Here we assume ε > 1, which is sufficient to ensure that the
marginal cost to inflating is positive in discretionary inflation and that the solution to the
monetary authority problem in the game with the wage setters is always a global maximum
(see Neiss, 1999: 361, 368).
9Capital is assumed fixed and normalized to unity.
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is on the interest rate, and monetary growth is determined endogenously by the
interest rate policies, the central bank ultimately commits to a fixed money
growth rate..
By solving the above model under flexible price it is easy to derive the
standard result of a distorted equilibrium:
lt =
α
η
1
μpμw
(6)
where are the price and wage markups, and the optimality of the Friedman rule,
i.e. a negative inflation rate equal to β− 1. By contrast, assuming preset prices
and/or wages, employment (or real activity) is unaffected and a Barro-Gordon’s
(1983) bias emerges (see Neiss, 1999).
3 Wage moderation and inflation targeting
We assume that central bank can commit to an interest rate rule that assures the
achievement of a certain exogenous inflation target. m, before than the wages
are set (i.e. preset wages as prices in Neiss, 1999). As commitment is on the
interest rate, and monetary growth is determined endogenously by the interest
rate policies, the central bank ultimately commits to a fixed money growth rate.
Formally, this commitment requires that the central bank implements a constant
nominal interest rate rule Rt = 1+mβ , which implies that
Mt+1
Mt
= 1 +m.10 The
model is solved by backward induction. The timing of the game is thus as
follows. Before the price level is known, at the beginning of the period, the
central bank chooses the inflation targeting. Then wage setters must choose
the nominal wage rate, wt = w¯etP
e
t , where P
e
t is the rational expectation of the
price level and w¯et is the desired real wage rate. Finally, full price flexibility
ensures that markets clear. The model is solved by backward induction. We
follow Neiss’ solution method.11
By solving the representative household’s (i) problem standard first order
conditions for consumption are obtained:12
ct(j) = Ct
µ
pt(j)
Pt
¶ 1
ρ−1
(7)
Ct =
1
β
1 + πet+1
Rt+1
Cet+1 (8)
where πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
− 1 denotes the inflation rate.
10 It is worth noticing that here we define inflation targeting as the case where target vari-
ables are variables appearing in reaction functions or behavioral rule (as e.g. Bernanke and
Woodford, 1997); while, in the literature is also often referred to variables in loss functions
(Svensson, 1997).
11 In this model there is no state variable to link periods and the policy problem is time
invariant; see Neiss (1999) for a discussion.
12 Index i is dropped for simplicity.
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The money demand equation is
Mt+1
Pt
=
¡
1 + πet+1
¢ /−1
ε
Ã
γβCt
1−R−1t+1
! 1
ε
(9)
Agent faces a trade-off between t period consumption and t+1 period hold-
ings of nominal money balances. Observe that (9) can also be interpreted as a
demand function: when the central bank increases next period nominal money
balances, coeteris paribus current consumption increases.
The condition about the optimal labor supply will be introduced at a later
stage, following a discussion of firms labour demand.
In the goods market, for any given level of its labor demand, lt,j , the firm
must decide the optimal allocation across labor inputs, subject to aggregation
technology (4). Firm (j) demand for labor type (i) is
lt,j (i) =
µ
wt (i)
wt
¶−σ
lt,j (10)
where wt =
∙Z 1
0
wt (i)
1−σ di
¸ 1
1−σ
is the wage index.
Prices are set as a mark-up over marginal costs:
pt,j = μp
1
α
wtl1−αt,j (11)
where μp = 1ρ denotes the price markup and υt is a production subsidy. Labour
demand from firm j is
lt,j =
µ
μp
α
wt
pt,j
¶− 11−α
Aggregating across firms we obtain
Yt = lαt (12)
lt (i) =
µ
wt (i)
wt
¶−σ
lt (13)
lt =
µ
μp
α
wt
pt
¶− 11−α
(14)
As nominal wages are predetermined to prices, the wage-setting problem is
solved by choosing the nominal wage that maximizes the expected value of (1)
subject to the rational expectation of the price level, pet . In this case the wage
setting rule takes this form:
wt = ημCet p
e
t (15)
and the ex-ante wage markup, μ, becomes policy endogenous.
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The monopolistic wage setters in fact anticipate that in equilibrium individ-
ual real money holdings fall with consumption:13
Mt,i
P et
=
µ
γβCet,i
1 +m− β
¶ 1
ε
(16)
and that consumption is a negative function of the real wage. Thus, under an
inflation targeting rule, wage setters anticipate that real money balances will
fall due to the adverse effect of the wage choice on consumption.
Formally, the wage setters maximize (1) subject to (9), which, by imposing
rational expectations (πe = m and P et = Pt), becomes (16). The wage setters’
first order condition in the symmetric equilibrium is:
σ − 1
σ
(1 + δm) = η
Ct
w¯
(17)
where the adverse effect is measured by δm = 1ε
∙
γ
³
1+m−β
β
´ε−1
C1−εt
¸ 1
ε
, which
is increasing in m (recall that ε > 1 for the marginal cost of inflation to be
positive.)
Straightforward manipulations lead to equation (18).
wt = η
μw
1 + δm
Cet p
e
t (18)
where:
δm =
1
ε
"
γ
µ
1 +m− β
βCet
¶ε−1# 1ε
(19)
For any level of expected consumption the ex-ante wage mark-up, μ, is dis-
ciplined by the inflation target, and the strength of this effect is growing with
m. Note also that if the central bank targeting is inspired by the Friedman
argument δm is zero, otherwise it is positive.14
By combining we obtain an implicit form for employment
lt =
α
η
1 + δm
μpμw
(20)
recall that the endogenous markup is a function of the consumption level, which
is non linearly related to the labor supply by the real wage.
By differentiating equation (20) we obtain:
∂lt
∂m
=
δm (ε− 1) lt
(1 +m− β) [(1 + δm) ε+ αδm (ε− 1)]
> 0 (21)
The effect of the target on employment (and thus consumption) is positive.
13Condition (16) is obtained from (9) imposing rational expectations.
14Of course, we abstract from the case where the central bank creates unnecessary deflation.
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The rationale for the above result can be explained by inspecting equation
(16). Wage setters anticipate that, given the target m, wage moderation in-
creases real money balances. Such an effect is stronger the higher the target.
In other words, under flexible wages, the trade union optimization problem is
solved by choosing a real wage such that consumption falls below the perfectly
competitive rate, i.e. μw. This loss of utility is more than compensated for
by the corresponding reduction in labour effort. By contrast, when wages are
predetermined, unions will anticipate the effect of the target on the correlation
between lower consumption and real money balances.
4 Welfare analysis
By targeting the Friedman rate the flexible price equilibrium is obtained. A rise
in the target clearly implies a trade off between inflation and real output as in
Benigno and Ricci (2008). The effects of targeting induced trade-off on welfare
can be evaluated by using equation (1). Intuitively, the optimal inflation target
will be between the Friedman deflationary rule and the positive inflation rate
ensuring the achievement of the Pareto optimal employment, according to the
agents’ preferences. However, due to the complexity of the analytical solution
of the model,15 we must rely on numerical simulations to evaluate it.
We calibrate the model by setting the discount rate (β) at 0.99, which cor-
responds to a yearly long-term real interest rate of 3%, the labor coefficient (α)
at 0.6 and we endogenously determine the scale parameter of labor disutility
(η) to normalize the Pareto optimal level to 1. We assume the income elasticity
of money demand (1/ε) to be 0.516 and set the money scale parameter (γ) to
0.005. Thus, to check the result robustness, we also consider alternative para-
meterization. We fix the price and wage markups to 1.1 and 1.2 respectively
(i.e. ρ = 0.9 and σ = 6).17
Welfare under different targets is plotted in figure 2.18
15The endogenous markup is a function of the consumption level, which is non linearly
related to both the subsidy and the real wage by the labor supply.
16 See e.g. Choi and Oh (2003), Dib (2004), Knell and Stix (2005) and references therein.
17We also test the robustness of our results by considering two alternative scenarios where
elasticity of substitution (σ) is chosen to obtain different wage markups: 1.05 and 1.15. The
former is closer to the calibration for the United States of Christiano et al. (2005) whereas
the latter to that of Gali et al. (2007). Results are almost identical.
18 In the figure inflation targets are annualized.
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Figure 2 — Welfare evaluation
In our quite standard calibration, the optimal target is about 2%.19
Regarding the effect of the money scale parameter, we consider four scenarios
to which are associated the following values for γ: 0.0005 (panel (a)), 0.005
(panel (b)), 0.05 (panel (c)), 0.5 (panel (d)). The scenarios are plotted in the
following figure.
19Results are robust with respect to reasonable changes in the parameters. Additional
simulations are available upon request.
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The figure confirms the robustness of our results and shows that an increase
in agents’ concerns for the real money balances implies a greater optimal tar-
get. It is worth noticing that, even if the money scale parameter is very low,
deviations from the Friedman rule are desirable.
5 Conclusions
Our model provides a rationale for targeting a positive inflation rate in the long
run. We thus suggest a reconsideration of inflationary equilibria as properly
designed monetary policies can take advantage of predetermined nominal wages
to discipline monopolistic wage setters, this requires accepting a non-zero in-
flation. A commitment to a non-zero inflation target in fact implies that the
central bank increases the expected marginal benefit of holding money. Thus
it induces wage setters to stimulate consumption by supporting employment
through moderate wage claims.
The key assumption for our result is that, differently from standard New
Keynesian models usually based on flexible wages, all nominal wages are pre-
10
determined to both the individual households’ and the policymaker’s decisions.
As a consequence, even if atomistic labor markets are considered (as usual in
the New Keynesian literature),20 the wage setters internalize the effects of their
choice on money holdings for the representative household’s welfare.
References
Acocella, N., G. Di Bartolomeo, and D.A. Hibbs (2008), “Labor market regimes
and monetary policy,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 30: 134-156.
Angeloni, I., L. Aucremanne, M. Ehrmann, J. Gali, A. Levin and F. Smets
(2006), “New evidence on inflation persistence and price stickiness in the
Euro area: Implications for macro modelling,” Journal of the European
Economic Association, 4: 562-574.
Albanesi, S. and V.V. Chari (2003), “Expectation traps and monetary policy,”
Review of Economic Studies, 70: 715-741.
Barro, R. and D. Gordon (1983), “A positive theory of monetary policy in a
natural rate model,” Journal of Political Economy, 91: 589-610.
Beetsma, R.M.W.J. and A.L. Bovenberg (1998), “Monetary union without fiscal
coordination may discipline policymakers,” Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 45: 239-258.
Benigno, P. and L. Ricci (2008), “The inflation-unemployment trade-off at low
inflation,” NBER Working Paper No. W13986.
Bernanke, B.S., and M. Woodford (1997), “Inflation forecasts and monetary
policy,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29: 653-684.
Blackburn, K. and A. Pelloni (2004), “On the relationship between growth and
volatility,” Economics Letters, 83 :123-127.
Blackburn, K. and A. Pelloni (2005), “Growth, cycles, and stabilization policy,”
Oxford Economic Papers, 57: 262-282
Corsetti, G. and P. Pesenti (2001), “Welfare and macroeconomic interdepen-
dence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116: 421-446.
Choi, W.G. and S. Oh (2003), “A money demand function with output uncer-
tainty, monetary uncertainty, and financial innovations,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 35: 685-709.
Christiano, L.J., M. Eichenbaum, C. Evans (2005), “Nominal rigidities and
the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy,” Journal of Political
Economy, 113: 1-45.
20See, among others, Erceg et al. (2000), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), Zanetti (2007).
Gnocchi (2006) is an exception.
11
Dib, A. (2004), “Nominal rigidities and monetary policy in Canada,” Journal
of Macroeconomics, 28: 303-325.
Di Bartolomeo, G., P. Tirelli and N. Acocella, (2008), “Trend inflation as a
workers disciplining device in a general equilibrium model,” Department of
Economics, University of Milan Bicocca, Working Paper No 142.
Dixit, A. and L. Lambertini (2003), “Interactions of commitment and discretion
in monetary and fiscal policies,” American Economic Review, 93: 1522-1542.
Erceg, C., D. Henderson, and A. Levin (2000), “Optimal monetary policy with
staggered wage and price contracts,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 46:
282-313.
Evans, G. and S. Honkapohja (2006), “Monetary policy, expectations and com-
mitment,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108: 15-38.
Galì, J., M. Gertler, and J.D. Lòpez-Salido (2007), “Markups, gaps, and the
welfare costs of business fluctuations,” The Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics, 89: 44-59.
Gnocchi, S. (2006), “Optimal simple monetary policy rules and non-atomistic
wage setters in a New-Keynesian,” ECB Working Paper No. 690.
Goodfriend, M. (1997), “A framework for the analysis of moderate inflations,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 39: 45-65.
Guzzo, V. and A. Velasco (1999), “The case for a populist central banker,”
European Economic Review, 43: 1317-1344.
Khan, A., R.G. King and A. Wolman (2003), “Optimal monetary policy,” Re-
view of Economic Studies, 70: 825-860.
Knell, M. and H. Stix (2005), “The income elasticity of money demand: A meta-
analysis of empirical results,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 19: 513-533.
Lippi, F. (2003), “Strategic monetary policy with non-atomistic wage setters,”
Review of Economic Studies, 70: 909-919.
Martin, P. and C. Rogers (1997), “Stabilization policy, growth and learning by
doing,” Oxford Economic Papers, 49: 152-166
Neiss, K.S. (1999), “Discretionary inflation in a general equilibrium model,”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 31: 357-374.
Rogoff, K. (1985), “The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate mon-
etary target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100: 1169-1190.
Ropele, T. and G. Ascari (2007), “Optimal monetary policy under low trend
inflation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 54: 2568-2583.
12
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe (2004), “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy
under sticky prices,” Journal of Economic Theory, 114: 198-230.
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe (2007), “Optimal in‡ation stabilization in a
medium-scale macroeconomic model,” in Monetary policy under inflation
targeting, edited by K. Schmidt-Hebbel and R. Mishkin, Central Bank of
Chile, Santiago, Chile: 125-186.
Stehn, S.J. and D. Vines (2008), ”Strategic interactions between an indepen-
dent central bank and a myopic government with government debt,” CEPR
Discussion Papers No 6913.
Svensson, L.E.O. (1997), “Optimal inflation targets, ‘conservative’ central
banks, and linear inflation contracts,” American Economic Review, 87: 98-
114.
Svensson, L.E.O. (1998), “Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 43: 607-654.
Soskice, D. and T. Iversen (1998), “Multiple wage-bargaining systems in a single
European currency area,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14: 110-124.
Soskice, D. and T. Iversen (2000), “The nonneutrality of monetary policy with
large price or wage setters,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 265-284.
Woodford, M. (2003), Interest rate and prices, Princeton, Princeton University
Press.
Zanetti, F. (2007), “A non-Walrasian labor market in a monetary model of the
business cycle,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31: 2413-2437.
13
